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INTRODUCTION
Houses of worship are more than mere bricks and mortar. For congregants, they are
sacred places of worship, contemplation, and fellowship. For the community-at-large, churches
define neighborhood skylines and often provide valuable social services. For preservationists,
churches represent some of the most ambitious (and controversial) architectural and design
efforts of past generations. As surrounding shops and residences have deteriorated or been
destroyed for redevelopment, churches often remain, as symbols of times past.
Historic preservation of churches can create unique tensions between congregations,
which want to be able to alter or demolish their buildings to meet changing needs, and
preservationists, who want to preserve their architectural integrity. Historic preservation
imposes substantial financial constraints on congregations. 1 Landmarking may make
maintenance more expensive and hinder the transferability of the property. 2 Religious groups,
citing the free exercise clause of the First Amendment 3 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 4 claim that historic preservation laws do not apply to
churches. Preservationists argue that religious groups should not receive special exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability.
This paper will analyze the tension between the historic preservation of sacred places and
the free exercise of religion as seen through the recent controversy surrounding the landmarking
of Third Church of Christ, Scientist, in Washington, D.C. Assuming Third Church would bring a

1

See Melanie E. Homer, Landmarking Religious Institutions: The Burden of Rehabiltation and the Loss
of Religious Freedom, 28 URB. LAWYER 327 (1996).
2
See Stephen M. Watson, First Amendment Challenges to Historic Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 115, 121 (1982); see also Evelyn B. Newell, Model Free Exercise Challenges for Religious
Landmarks, 34 CASE W. RES. L. R. 144, 154-57 (1983) (describing in detail four hypothetical burdens on
religious exercise).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
42 U.S.C. §2000cc (2000).
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free exercise and RLUIPA challenge if the District denied a demolition permit, this paper will
examine how such a suit would likely fail.
After describing the factual background, the paper will evaluate questions of standing and
ripeness. The mere fact of landmarking does not create a cause of action recognized by District
of Columbia courts, so any potential suit would have to be brought after administrative remedies
are exhausted. The paper will then analyze the potential challenge under pre-RLUIPA free
exercise jurisprudence and conclude that despite cases to the contrary in Kansas and Washington
State, the denial of a demolition permit is not a violation of free exercise under the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Employment Division v. Smith. 5 The paper will then address the inherent
contradictions within RLUIPA when religious entities try to invoke strict scrutiny to challenge
historic preservation laws. While claiming to codify existing free exercise jurisprudence and not
confer immunity from land use regulations to religious entities, RLUIPA contradictorily seems
to expand free exercise protections by triggering strict scrutiny review upon a showing of an
“individualized assessment” by a government body in land use decisions.
Although a District of Columbia court likely would not find the District’s denial of a
demolition permit to violate the free exercise clause, a court’s determination of a RLUIPA
violation is a much closer question and would depend on how it interprets “substantial burden.”
Circuit courts are split, but the more compelling precedent suggests that the District’s insistence
on preserving the landmarked church would not violate RLUIPA. The mere denial of a
demolition permit to Third Church--absent a showing by the church of economic hardship
triggering a taking--would not violate the expanded protections afforded religious groups
through RLUIPA because the denial does not make religious exercise “effectively impracticable”

5

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

2

and increased costs on religious beliefs are not alone a substantial burden.

I. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE LANDMARKING OF THIRD CHURCH OF
CHRIST, SCIENTIST
Third Church of Christ, Scientist in Washington, D.C. does not look like a traditional
church. Situated two blocks north of the White House, the church is an octagonal structure, with
high concrete, windowless walls, that stands in an unadorned plaza on 16th St. NW. Araldo
Cossutta, a principal architect in the renowned firm of I.M. Pei, designed the structure, which
was finished in 1971. The church is considered an example of Brutalist architecture—a midtwentieth century movement that emphasized the use of rough, poured-in-place concrete as the
building medium. 6
In late 2007, the Committee of 100 of the Federal City and the District of Columbia
Preservation League nominated the church for landmark status. In December 2007, the District
of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB), based on the testimony of multiple
architects, architectural historians, and other knowledgeable experts regarding the building’s
architectural significance, 7 granted landmark status to the entire church complex: the octagonal

6

Paul Schwartzman, Church Gets Landmark Status over Congregation’s Objections, WASH. POST., Dec.
7, 2007, at B03.
7
D.C HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE, STAFF REPORT FOR THIRD CHURCH OF CHRIST, SCIENTIST (Nov.
1, 2007) (on file with author). The Historic Preservation Office’s staff report noted that the church “was
one of the best examples of Brutalism in the Washington area and one of the most important Modernist
churches.” Id. at 2. In addition, the design won the Washington Board of Trade’s Award for Excellence
in Architecture and a craftsmanship award for the concrete work from the Washington Building Congress.
Id. at 4. Thus, the church complex satisfied the Historic Preservation Review Board’s designation
criterion F, for “notable works of craftsmen, artists, sculptors, architects, landscape architects, urban
planners, engineers, builders, or developers whose works have influenced the evolution of their fields of
endeavor, or are significant to the development of the District of Columbia or the nation.” Id. at 10.
Richard Longstreth, a George Washington University architectural history professor, testified before the
board that the Third Church complex is “in a league of its own” as a “distinctive and original work.”
Mark Fisher, State vs. Church: March of the Preservation Police, WASH. POST., Dec. 7, 2007,
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church itself, the rectangular office building that housed the offices of the Christian Science
Monitor, and the triangular courtyard between the church and office building. 8 The congregation
opposed the landmark designation at the December meeting. They claimed the structure, which
holds 400 people, was too large for the congregation of forty to sixty weekly worshippers. The
congregants expressed concern about the costs of maintaining the aging structure. They also
stated that the building’s fortress-like design impeded their worship and ability to attract new
members. 9
The landmarking has frustrated the plans of the congregation. The Mother Church of
Christian Science had conveyed the property to a commercial real estate developer, ICG, who
promised to construct a smaller sanctuary on the site. At the landmarking hearing, the church
was represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a public interest law firm that
provides legal services to religious organizations. 10 Since the HPRB would have to issue a
demolition permit for the developer to tear down the church, the church, through the Becket
Fund, may choose to challenge a denial of that permit. “We have let HPRB know that it is
treading on dangerous ground,” said the church’s counsel. 11

II. BACKGROUND ON FREE EXERCISE LAW
A. Supreme Court Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence has changed significantly over the past
forty years and has been a source of much controversy. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Warren Court

http://blog.washingtonpost.com/rawfisher/2007/12/state_vs_church_march_of_the_p.html.
8
Schwartzman, supra note 6.
9
Darrow Kirkpatrick, a congregant who opposed the designation, testified: “We know of no way to adapt
the building to meet our needs….It’s not a welcoming building.” Schwartzman, supra note 6.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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held that burdens upon religious exercise were subject to strict scrutiny—that is, for the
government action or law to survive judicial review the government had to assert both a
compelling interest and that its action or law was narrowly tailored to achieve this objective. 12
Commentators saw this standard to be extremely favorable to religious groups. The Sherbert
compelling interest test was the prevailing free exercise standard until the Court’s 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith, which held that neutral, generally applicable laws were subject
to rational basis review, not strict scrutiny. 13 The Sherbert compelling interest test still applied
to government action that was not neutral toward religion or generally applicable.
There were however, two exceptions to the Smith rule imposing rational basis review.
First, where the claim is “hybrid”—in that it combines free exercise with another constitutional
right (like freedom of speech)—strict scrutiny is appropriate. 14 Second, “where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” 15 The individualized exemption exception can
be summarized as follows: as long as a law does not contain any exemptions, it is considered
generally applicable and religious groups cannot claim a right to exemption; however, if a law
has secular exemptions, then religious groups can challenge the law.16 In the words of the Tenth
Circuit, “the general applicability test gives religious groups something akin to a disparate
treatment claim.” 17 By requiring the government to merely show a rational basis for its actions
in most cases, the Court immediately made it more difficult for individuals and religious entities
to bring successful free exercise challenges.

12

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990).
14
Id. at 882.
15
Id. at 884.
16
See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 650 (10th Cir. 2006).
17
Id.
13

5

B. RFRA
Unsurprisingly, the Smith decision was not popular with certain constituencies. Several
years later Congress approved and President Clinton signed into law the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which attempted to overturn Smith and “restore” the
compelling interest test for federal and state actions that “substantially burdened” the free
exercise of religion, even if such burdens derived from neutral rules of general applicability. 18
Four years later, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 19 the Supreme Court held RFRA to be
unconstitutional, although subsequent courts have suggested that RFRA would still apply to
federal governmental action. 20
The Court in City of Boerne dismissed a church’s RFRA challenge to a Texas town’s
denial of a demolition permit for a historic sanctuary building. 21 Although Congress may
enforce constitutional rights pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in
City of Boerne held that Congress had not simply enforced First Amendment rights but had
exceeded its constitutional authority by defining the boundaries of those rights. 22 The Court
stressed that RFRA was out of proportion to its supposed remedial or preventative object,
considering that Congress had presented no evidence in the legislative record of any widespread
pattern of religious discrimination by states or the federal government. 23

C. RLUIPA
Not dissuaded, Congress passed new legislation, the Religious Land Use and

18

See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 (2000).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20
See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
21
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
22
Id. at 508-09.
23
Id. at 509.
19
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Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which President Clinton signed into law in
September 2000. RLUIPA reinstated the same general rule of RFRA: state action that
substantially burdens religious exercise can be justified only as the “least restrictive means” of
further a “compelling governmental interest.”24 However, RLUIPA, unlike RFRA, did not apply
to all government action but only to state or federal government action involving land use or
institutionalized persons. Within the context of land use regulation, RLUIPA applies where the
“burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use
regulations, under which a government makes…individualized assessments of the proposed uses
for the property involved.” 25
The purpose in passing RLUIPA’s land use provisions was to eliminate covert
discrimination against religious groups by zoning boards. 26 Despite its sweeping language, the
statute was not intended to immunize religious institutions from local land use laws. 27
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA only in regard to its
application to institutionalized persons. 28 Lower courts have generally agreed that RLUIPA is
constitutional in regard to land use regulations. 29 However, no court has addressed RLUIPA’s
constitutionality as applied to historic preservation laws, and the legislative record of RLUIPA

24

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a) (2000). The full text of § 2000cc is in Appendix A.
§ 2000cc(a)(2).
26
See Daniel Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: the Overbroad Applications and Troubling Implications
of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 816 (2006).
27
A joint statement issued by the sponsors of the legislation, Senators Hatch and Kennedy, explains,
“This Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity form land use regulation, no does it
relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship
approval, or other relief provision in land use regulations, where available without discrimination or
unfair delay.” 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
28
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
29
See, e.g., United States v. Maui County, 298 F. Supp.2d 1010 (D. Haw. 2003) (upholding
constitutionality of LUIPA against establishment clause, enforcement clause, commerce clause, and Tenth
Amendment challenges); Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2006) (upholding RLUIPA as valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers).
25
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does not contain any examples of religious discrimination in the application of historic
preservation ordinances. 30
Considering that the Supreme Court struck down RFRA in City of Boerne because
Congress had not provided any evidence of religious discrimination to justify its use of its
enforcement powers, RLUIPA as applied to the historic preservation context may well be
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, for this paper, the constitutionality of RLIUPA is assumed.
Thus, under the current constitutional and statutory framework, an individual or religious
entity can bring a challenge to a burdensome government action both under the First Amendment
and under RLUIPA. Part IV of his paper will analyze a potential challenge under the First
Amendment and Part V will assess a claim under RLUIPA by Third Church.

III. CONSIDERATIONS OF STANDING AND RIPENESS
A. Standing
The first issue that must be addressed is whether the church has standing to bring a free
exercise or RLUIPA claim when it no longer owns the land. The standing analysis is hindered
by the uncertainty surrounding the terms of the church’s lease with the developer. In all other
cases where a religious organization has challenged historic preservation regulations, it has
owned the property being regulated. 31 In contrast, while the Christian Science Mother Church,
based in Boston, originally owned the land on which Third Church currently sits and leased the
land to the congregation, a developer currently owns the property and continues to lease it back
to Third Church.

30

See Julia Miller, Regulating Historic Religious Properties Under RLUIPA, SL014 ALI-ABA 719, 731
(2005).
31
See, e.g., Soc’y of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 409 Mass. 38 (1990).
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Standing for a Free Exercise Claim
To have standing for a free exercise challenge, plaintiffs must prove that particular
religious freedoms are or will be infringed. 32 Third Church can assert that the burdens imposed
by the historic preservation regulations limit the space in which the congregation worships and
impose financial costs that detract from religious and social initiatives. Moreover, the fact that
no court has yet dismissed a challenge to a historic preservation law on standing grounds
strongly suggests that even though Third Church does not own the property in question, it would
still satisfy the standing requirements for a free exercise claim. 33

Standing for a RLUIPA claim
The general rules of standing under Article III of the Constitution also governs standing
for purposes of RLUIPA; so the standing analysis is identical for potential constitutional and
statutory challenges. 34 But RLUIPA’s protections only apply to two areas: institutionalized
persons and land use regulations. As a consequence, Third Church’s claim has to be related to a
land use regulation in order for it to bring a suit.
Nevertheless, courts have recognized that plaintiffs who have a definite but nonpossessory interest in the land—such as those who will receive the land as part of a contract or
other agreement—do have standing to challenge zoning decisions. 35 In Dilaura v. Ann Arbor
Township, a religious organization entered into an agreement with a land development company

32

Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
However, the lack of a concrete property interest would implicate standing if Third Church sought to
also bring a Fifth Amendment takings challenge. This paper will not address a separate Fifth Amendment
takings challenge, but Part VI analyzes how a “substantial burden” on religion resembles the burden of
proving an unconstitutional taking.
34
42 U.S.C. 2000cc-2(a) (2000).
35
Dilaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., 30 Fed. Appx. 501, 506 (6th Cir. 2002).
33
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to receive a residential home for free, if the home could be used for religious purposes. The
court held that the contingency interest did not render the religious organization's interest
unenforceable because a definite agreement existed. 36
The court cited RLUIPA, which defined a “land use regulation” that could be challenged
under RLUIPA as any “zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits
or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the
regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.” 37 Therefore, the religious
group in Dilaura successfully met the standing requirement because it had an option to acquire a
property interest in the property at issue.
Without more information about the structure of the contractual agreement between the
developer and Third Church, it is difficult to completely analyze the standing question.
Nevertheless, if the developer and Third Church have a similar arrangement that grants Third
Church some type of property interest, even if nothing more than a lease, Third Church can
likely satisfy the standing requirement, particularly because courts sometimes liberalize standing
requirements with respect to the raising of First Amendment issues.38

B. Ripeness
Assuming that that Third Church would have standing to bring a suit under both the First
Amendment and RLUIPA, the next issue becomes at what point the challenge becomes ripe for
judicial review. The mere act of landmarking a historic church building does not present a

36

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).
38
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting taxpayer-plaintiff standing to challenge funding
scheme that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
37
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justiciable controversy under the First Amendment. 39
In Metropolitan Baptist v. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, the D.C. Court
of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the church’s free exercise challenge to the inclusion of five
church-owned rowhouses in the Greater 14th Street Historic District. 40 The court stated that
historic designation did not impede the current use of the buildings and that because the church
had not yet applied for a permit to alter or demolish the rowhouses, its claim was based solely on
harm that might occur in the future. 41 The court stressed that one of the purposes of the ripeness
doctrine was to protect “‘agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties,’” and that
allowing the church’s challenge to go forward in the absence of a final administrative decision
would needlessly entangle the courts in administrative policies. 42
The Metropolitan Baptist court specifically declined to follow the precedent of the
Washington State courts, which have found landmark designations, as applied, to be violations of
free exercise under the federal and state constitutions. 43 The Court of Appeals distinguished the
Washington case partly on the grounds that the Washington State Constitution provided broader

39

Metro. Baptist Church v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Reg. Affairs, 918 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1998); see also
Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 US. 985
(1986) (rejecting church’s free exercise challenge to landmark designation where church had not yet
applied for a permit). But see First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle
Landmarks Preservation Board, 916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1996) (holding that landmark designation violated
church’s free exercise under federal and state constitutions because the designation restricted the church’s
ability to sell its property to further its religious mission); Munns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1997)
(holding that landmark designation of religious school is a violation of the state constitution). The
District Court of Connecticut held that in regard to a ripeness inquiry, it was not necessary to distinguish
an RLUIPA claim from a First Amendment free exercise claim. Murphy v. New Milford Zoning
Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 2005).
40
Id. at 130.
41
Id. at 130.
42
Id. at 130 (quoting Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)).
43
Id. at 131-32 (distinguishing First United Methodist, 916 P.2d 374 (1996)).
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protection for religious freedom than the federal constitution. 44
Thus, Third Church’s claim would not be ripe until the administrative decision was
formalized; in other words, until the HPRB denied the demolition permit and the Mayor’s Agent,
through the normal appeals process, affirmed the HPRB’s decision.

IV. ANALYSIS OF A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE BY THIRD CHURCH
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Historic preservation laws are neutral and generally applicable
The threshold question in a free exercise challenge under the First Amendment is whether
the government action allegedly burdening the exercise of religion is neutral and generally
applicable. If it is not, then strict scrutiny will apply. But if the historic preservation regulation
is neutral and generally applicable and the regulations do not involve hybrid rights and do not
have individualized exemptions, then rational basis will apply.
Historic preservation laws are neutral and of general applicability—and can thus burden
free exercise—because they do not aim to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation and do not in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated
by religious belief. 45 The Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah strongly suggests that historic preservation laws may be viewed as generally

44

Id. at 132. In a footnote, the court also distinguished First United Methodist on the grounds that the
church in that case was suffering from deterioration, unlike the rowhouses of Metropolitan Baptist, and
that repairs would only be affordable absent government regulations. This footnote suggests that if a
court finds that Third Church is deteriorating and maintenance costs would be prohibitively expensive,
the church may have a stronger case of distinguishing Metropolitan Baptist. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that even this would overcome the court’s reluctance to intervene before a final administrative
determination.
45
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); see also San Jose
Christian Coll., 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that city’s denial of Christian college’s
petition for rezoning was not targeted on basis of religion and thus not a violation of free exercise.)
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applicable, even if a demolition permit may be denied through an individualized hearing process.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Lukumi to a zoning ordinance, explained that in
order for a plaintiff to invoke strict scrutiny, the individual must present evidence “suggesting
that the ordinance was passed due to religious animus”; evidence showing that “the city
specifically targeted religious groups . . . in its enforcement of the ordinance”; or evidence that
the municipality, through its ordinances, “ha[d] ‘devalue[d] religious reasons . . . by judging
them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons.’” 46
The animosity toward religious practice addressed in Lukumi is not relevant here, because
local historic preservation boards only decide to landmark buildings that meet specific threshold
criteria, which are predetermined, explicit, and not religiously motivated.47 The HPRB voted to
landmark Third Church because of the church’s architecture, not out of any religious
motivation. 48 While the decision to landmark a particular building does involve discretion and
subjective tastes about aesthetics, the majority of the Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York explicitly stated that subjective elements considered in
the landmarking process do not make the final decision arbitrary. 49 Instead, historic

46

Grace United, 451 F.3d 643, 650 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537).
For the seven criteria that HPRB uses in determining whether to approve landmark status, see 10
DCMR § 200.1 (2002). Some confusion here. The first sentence correctly refers to the regs; but the
second, is a non-sequitur ; and comes from the statute?? For example, subsection (e) provides: “No
permit shall be issued unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the public
interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the owner.” §
200.1(e).
48
In contrast, the Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance that criminalized animal sacrifice
within city limits because the Court found that the city council, in passing the ordinance, was motivated
by animus toward Santerians and excluded many other activities that killed animals (medical research,
butchers) from the ban. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 530.
49
438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978). “[C]ontrary to appellants’ suggestions, landmark laws are not like
discriminatory, or ‘reverse spot,’ zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones…. In contrast to
discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the
New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest
47
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preservation, like zoning, is generally applicable because it treats similar property in a similar
manner within a generally applicable scheme. 50 In St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New
York, the Second Circuit explicitly held that landmarks laws are “facially neutral regulations of
general applicability within the meaning of Supreme Court decisions.” 51 In addition, the
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores assumed in dicta that the preservation ordinance at
issue was a law of general application. 52 Therefore, historic preservation laws are likely both
neutral and generally applicable.

B. Regulation of religious property does not implicate freedom of speech
Assuming historic preservation laws are neutral and generally applicable, plaintiffs may
still attempt to invoke strict scrutiny under Smith by asserting a hybrid claim: that the historic
preservation law infringes both free exercise and free speech. 53 Professor Angela Carmella
argues that because architecture is closely intertwined with expression, religious architecture
constitutes religious speech and is consequently protected not only by the Free Exercise Clause
but also the Free Speech Clause. 54 “The semiotic nature of the house of worship,” she writes,

wherever they might be found in the city…. Equally without merit is the related argument that the
decision to designate a structure as a landmark “is inevitably arbitrary or at least subjective, because it is
basically a matter of taste.” Id.
50
Id.
51
St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 353 (2nd Cir. 1990).
52
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997).
53
The hybrid rights claim is not without controversy. As the Tenth Circuit in Grace United stated, “The
hybrid rights doctrine…. has been characterized as mere dicta not binding on lower courts, Knight v.
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir.2001); criticized as illogical, Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993); and dismissed as untenable.” Grace United, 451
F.3d 643, 656 (D. Wyo. 2006). For simplicity, this paper assumes the validity of the hybrid rights
exception in Smith.
54
See Angela Carmella, Landmark Preservation of Church Property, 34 CATH. LAW. 41, 60 (1991);
Russell S. Bonds, First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle: The Washington Supreme Court Fortifies the
Free Exercise Rights of Religious Landmarks Against Historic Preservation Restrictions, Comment, 27
GA. L. REV. 589, 614 (1992)
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“renders its ‘religious’ and ‘aesthetic’ aspects indistinguishable.” 55 Therefore, when the
government attempts to control ecclesiastical design for purely aesthetic reasons, 56 it “severely
compromises the religious community’s freedom to adapt its worship structure to its liturgical,
theological, doctrinal, and missional goals” as well as the congregation’s ability to protect its
“expression and vitality.” 57 The Washington State courts in First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle and First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for Seattle Landmarks
Preservation Board embraced this idea that ecclesiastical architecture is an expression of
religious ideas and that landmarking churches implicated both free speech and free exercise. 58
In striking down Seattle’s landmark designation of First Covenant Church, the court held
that “regulation of the church’s exterior impermissibly infringes on the religious organization’s
right to free exercise and free speech.” 59 Moreover, in Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, citing its state constitution, struck down the
interior designation of a Jesuit church because the “configuration of the church interior is so
freighted with religious meaning that it must be considered part and parcel of the Jesuits’
religious worship.” 60
However, unlike Society of Jesus, the landmark designation for Third Church only
applies to the exterior of the building, and Washington remains the only state to have made
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landmark designation subject to a hybrid claim. Although the issue of a hybrid claim was not
before the D.C. Court of Appeals in Metropolitan Baptist, that court’s distinguishing of First
United Methodist and First Covenant make it likely that the Court of Appeals would also reject
the hybrid claim argument. 61 Moreover, the Washington State cases conflicts with the Supreme
Court’s dicta in Berman v. Parker, which suggests that even municipal regulations solely based
on aesthetics (and without any historic element) would be constitutionally permissible and not
subject to First Amendment challenges. 62
In addition, the California courts have rejected the idea that land use regulations always
implicate the Free Speech Clause. In San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that zoning ordinances that restrict religious entities from
fully developing their properties do not implicate the Free Speech Clause unless the ordinances
contain content-based discrimination or unless the city enacted or enforced the ordinances as a
“pretext for suppressing expression.” 63 In San Jose Christian, the city denied a religious group’s
petition to rezone a parcel to educational use. The religious college, the owner of the property,
claimed that the building on the property was itself “speech.” 64 Ignoring the idea that the
property itself constituted symbolic speech, the court, in upholding the rezoning denial, instead
looked to the effect and purpose behind the ordinance. 65 The court held that because the
ordinance did not prohibit all religious uses within the city and was not a “pretext for suppressing
expression,” 66 it was not a content-based restriction on religious speech. 67 The court
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distinguished cases where land use laws were subject to free speech protections because those
cases involved adult movie theaters that the city was attempting to zone out of existence. 68
Because Morgan Hill was not motivated by a disdain of the college’s religious orientation, or by
the message that would have been communicated by the property, “no viable impingement of
speech claim has been asserted.” 69
Similarly, the District’s landmarking of religious buildings does not prohibit all religious
uses within the city and is not a pretext for suppressing expression. The landmark designation
does not prevent religious uses within the landmarked building; it merely prevents a change in
the status quo. While the preservation restrictions undoubtedly impose costs on religious
exercise, courts generally have not considered the effects of freezing current uses sufficient to
rise to the level of an economic taking or a substantial burden on free exercise. 70 In addition, the
District’s historic preservation regulations, like the zoning ordinance in Morgan Hill, is not a
pretext for suppressing religious speech and was not motivated by disdain for religion.
Therefore, absent a showing of discriminatory treatment, the District courts likely would dismiss
Third Church’s hybrid claim.

C. The denial of a demolition permit is not an individualized exemption under Smith
In a First Amendment challenge, the issue of whether the historic preservation laws
contain individualized exemptions—and thus fall under Sherbert’s compelling interest test—is a
much closer case. Courts have disagreed on whether preservation ordinances contain a system of

68
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individualized exemptions. 71 Nevertheless, the individualized exemption exception to the
rational basis test articulated by the Supreme Court in Smith and applied in Lukumi should not be
read to provide religious entities “special treatment,” so long as the administrator has some
criteria to narrow decision-making and there is no evidence of religious discrimination.

Five circuits refuse to apply strict scrutiny notwithstanding individualized exemptions
The Second, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that land use or
historic preservation regulations do not trigger strict scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that they
may have individualized procedures for obtaining special use permits or variances. 72 In Grace
United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, the Tenth Circuit declined to apply strict scrutiny
to the town’s denial of a license authorizing a religious day care center. 73 The court rejected a
per se test that would subject any land use regulation to strict scrutiny and adopted a fact-specific
inquiry to determine the existence of discriminatory animus or an application of the rule in “a
discriminatory fashion that disadvantages religious groups or organizations.” 74
The Tenth Circuit distinguished the land use exemptions at issue in Grace United from
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson. In Axson-Flynn, the court found that a system of individualized
exemptions might exist where a Mormon student in an actor’s training program had been
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required, while reciting a script, to utter certain words offensive to her religious beliefs, but a
Jewish student had received permission to miss certain class exercises for religious reasons
without suffering adverse consequences. 75 In addition to the absence of any criteria for the
university to exempt students from the academic program, the court also stressed the possibility
of religious animus. 76 The court in Grace United thus reasoned that although special use permits
or variances generally require individualized assessments about the property, the ordinances are
motivated by secular purposes and equally impact all land owners within the city that seek a
variance or special use permit. 77
In St. Bartholomew’s, the Second Circuit assumed without deciding that the demolition
provision in the New York City landmarks law did not constitute an individualized exemption.
Although the exemption exception was announced by the Supreme Court in Smith before the
Second Circuit decided St. Bartholomew’s, the Second Circuit ultimately decided it was worth
only a brief mention. Acknowledging that the landmarks law “accords great discretion” to the
city’s Landmarks Commission, the court went on to state that “absent proof of the discriminatory
exercise of discretion” such discretion was constitutionally irrelevant. 78 The court compared
historic preservation to zoning, in which “the exercise of discretion is [hardly] constrained by
scientific principles or unaffected by selfish or political interests,” and which “passes
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constitutional muster.” 79
Interestingly, on the very day the Supreme Court denied certiorari in St. Bartholomew’s,
it vacated and remanded the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in First Covenant for
further consideration in light of Smith, thereby implying that Seattle’s historic preservation law
did not warrant strict scrutiny. 80 While the denial of certiorari is not binding precedent, the
Supreme Court has effectively endorsed the Second Circuit’s opinion in St. Bartholomew’s by
denying certiorari in that case and by vacating and remanding First Covenant.

A few courts have found individualized exemptions and have applied strict scrutiny
However, several courts have held otherwise and applied strict scrutiny. In Keeler v.
Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, the District Court of Maryland held that the city’s
preservation ordinance had implemented a system of individualized exemptions that triggered
strict scrutiny. 81 The court analyzed the circumstances under which the preservation board could
allow an alteration or demolition of a protected property: when the retention of the landmark 1)
would prevent a “major improvement program which will be of substantial benefit to the City,”
2) “would cause undue financial hardship,” or 3) “would not be to the best interest of a majority
of persons in the community.” 82
The court thus concluded that the city’s ordinance embodied a legislative judgment that
the city’s interest in historic preservation should, in some individual circumstances, give way to
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other interests, such as furthering major development and exempting property owners from
financial hardship. The Cumberland ordinance regarding demolition of historic landmarks is
similar to the District of Columbia’s. Section 6-1104 of the District of Columbia Code states,
“No permit shall be issued unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the
public interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasonable economic hardship to
the owner.” 83 The statute lists detailed information required for a finding of economic
hardship, 84 but the finding of “in the public interest” is a subjective determination. Although
Maryland and Kansas would apply strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court’s decision to deny cert in
St. Bartholomew’s and vacate First Covenant in the same term strongly suggests that the Court
considers historic preservation laws as neutral, generally applicable laws not subject to strict
scrutiny.

D. The required maintenance of a landmarked church is not necessarily a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion
The strict scrutiny inquiry asks whether the government has placed a substantial burden
on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden. 85 It is a “basic precept” of First Amendment
jurisprudence that not every governmental act that burdens religion violates the free exercise
clause: “The First Amendment is only offended if there is a substantial burden on religious
exercise.” 86 Consequently, even if a court in the District of Columbia were to apply the
individualized exemption of Smith, thereby triggering strict scrutiny, Third Church still must
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show a substantial burden on its religious exercise for its free exercise claim to prevail. Because
courts repeatedly have held that indirect financial or aesthetic burdens on religious groups are not
substantial, the denial of a demolition permit likely would not rise to the level of a substantial
burden on religion.
Substantial burdens arise when the government coerces a person to engage in an action
that violates a fundamental tenet of his or her genuinely held religious beliefs. 87 Substantial
burdens also occur when the government forces an individual to choose between following a
basic tenet of his or her faith and forfeiting a government benefit.88 However, states do not
substantially burden religious exercise when laws indirectly make the practice of religion more
expensive. 89 In Brownfield v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing
law, even though it imposed a serious financial burden on an Orthodox Jew, whose faith
prevented him from also working on Saturday. 90 Although the state law increased financial
hardship and made practicing one’s religion more difficult, the Court held that the law did not
interfere with or impede a religious observation. 91
A refusal by a landmarking body to allow religious groups to alter or demolish historic
structures has never been held to be a substantial burden upon free exercise. 92 In St.
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Bartholomew’s, the Second Circuit rejected an Episcopal church’s claim that the city’s refusal to
allow it to tear down an historic auxiliary building was a violation of free exercise. 93 The church
sought permission to replace its community building with a forty-seven story office tower. 94
The developer partnering with Third Church plans to replace the church with an office
building as well. Citing its weak financial condition, the unsuitability of the building for its
activities, and the cost of structural and mechanical repairs of its historic property, St.
Bartholomew’s—like Third Church—claimed the new office tower would provide better space
for its activities and generate needed revenues. 95 While the preservation law “drastically
restricted” the church’s opportunity to raise funds and to expand its activities, the Second Circuit
held that the denial of the demolition permit did not prevent the church from following its beliefs
and was thus not a violation of the free exercise clause. 96
Key to the court’s holding in St. Bartholomew’s was the church’s inability to prove it
could no longer continue its religious practice in its historic structure. Thus, for Third Church to
escape from the weight of St. Bartholomew’s precedent, it must assert that the current structure
effectively prevents its religious practice. The fact that religious practice might be better served
in a new facility is irrelevant. While Third Church can argue that the present structure is
foreboding and unwelcoming, they will likely be unable to prove that the facility is unsuitable for
religious exercise, especially because the church originally approved the architect’s plans.
However, courts in Washington, Kansas, and Maryland have held that historic

historic church was not a substantial burden); Diocese of Toledo v. Toledo County-Lucas County
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preservation laws impose unconstitutional burdens on religion. For example, in First Covenant
Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, the Washington State Supreme Court held that Seattle’s
historic preservation ordinances, as applied, burdened religious exercise “administratively,” by
requiring a religious entity to seek the approval before alteration or demolition, and
“financially,” by reducing the value of the landmarked property by fifty percent. 97 The court
acknowledged that not all financial burdens upon religion violate free exercise but found that the
fifty-percent reduction in value of the church property at issue was a “gross” financial burden. 98
In Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, the United States District Court of
Maryland held that a city’s refusal to allow demolition of a monastery and chapel in a historic
district violated the free exercise under federal and Maryland constitutions. 99 The Catholic
Archdiocese of Baltimore wanted to demolish an historic structure and replace it with a newer
building in order to improve accessibility, parking, and meeting space. 100 The Keeler court
found that the city’s historic preservation law contained a series of individualized exceptions and
applied strict scrutiny. 101 However, the court accepted as true the archdiocese’s claims that the
denial of the demolition permit burdened its free exercise rights and applied strict scrutiny
without determining whether those free exercise rights were substantially burdened.
Similarly, in Mount St. Scholastica, Inc. v. City of Atchison, the United States District
Court in Kansas, applying strict scrutiny, held that a city’s denial of a demolition permit for an
historic monastic property violated the free exercise clause. 102 The city did not dispute that
burdened religious practice, so the court, like the Maryland court in Keeler, accepted as true the
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plaintiff’s alleged burden on religious exercise without once analyzing whether the alleged
burden was substantial. 103
Although First Covenant, Keeler, and Mount St. Scholastica directly conflict with the
holding of St. Bartholomew’s, these three cases are distinguishable. The courts in Keeler and
Mount St. Scholastica did not analyze whether a substantial burden had occurred. Although First
Covenant held a fifty-percent reduction in value to be a substantial burden, even if Third Church
were to prove such a reduction, the Washington court’s opinion would not be compelling
precedent. The Washington State Supreme Court, acknowledging its dislike of the new Smith
test, 104 also grounded its decision in the Washington State Constitution, which is “significantly
different and stronger than the federal Constitution.” 105 While the First Amendment limits
government action that prohibits free exercise, the Washington Constitution “absolutely”
protects freedom of worship and prohibits any conduct that merely “disturbs” religious
conduct. 106 Therefore, in light of the unique provisions of the Washington Constitution, First
Covenant would be inapplicable in the District of Columbia.
Moreover, the application of strict scrutiny without a finding of a substantial burden in
Keeler and Mount St. Scholastica conflicts with Supreme Court dicta in Smith. Fearing the
“anarchy” that would result from a liberal application of strict scrutiny to neutral laws, the
majority in Smith cautioned: “[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid,
as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest
of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally
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required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind….” 107
Even Justice O’Connor, who dissented in Smith and wanted to preserve the Sherbert
compelling interest test, recognized that courts must first consider the scope of the alleged
burden: the proper approach is “to determine whether the burden on the specific plaintiffs before
us is constitutionally significant and whether the particular criminal interest asserted by the State
before us is compelling.” 108 Therefore, by applying strict scrutiny before determining whether a
substantial burden on religious has occurred, the courts in Keeler and Mount St. Scholastica
depart from the proper compelling interest test they purport to follow.

V. ANALYSIS OF A POTENTIAL SUIT UNDER RLUIPA
A. Protections to religious exercise under RLUIPA
As discussed above, RLUIPA prohibits the federal and state governments from imposing
substantial burdens on religious exercise unless the government shows its action is the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. 109 RLUIPA does not define what
constitutes a “substantial burden” of religious exercise, but it expands the scope of “religious
exercise” to include not only “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief” but also “the use, building, or conversion of real property” for
religious purposes. 110
The substantial burden analysis under RLUIPA is supposed to be identical to that under
the First Amendment, and yet different outcomes have resulted in a few courts. 111 Sen. Orrin
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Hatch (R-UT), one of the sponsors of RLUIPA, explained to the Senate, “it is not the intent of
this Act to create a new standard for the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise.
Instead, that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court
jurisprudence.” 112
But not all courts have agreed with Sen. Hatch’s interpretation. The United States
District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania commented, “Viewed in the light that the
RLUIPA effectively changed the type of burdens that require judicial intervention, it appears that
there are two types of burdens on the exercise of religion: those defined by free exercise case law
both prior to and during the effectiveness of the RFRA, and those that have been recognized
since the passage of the RLUIPA.” 113 Thus, according to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a
government action can be a violation of RLUIPA but not a violation of the free exercise
clause. 114 This problem arises because the language of the statute conflicts with its legislative
history. 115 RLUIPA was intended to remedy intentional discrimination against religion in zoning
decisions, yet if interpreted broadly the statute can give religious organizations a per se
exemption from historic preservation regulations even in the absence of discrimination. 116
As discussed above, RLUIPA applies only in specific contexts; the most relevant of
which in this case is when a substantial burden results from a regulation that allows the
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government to make “individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property
involved.” 117 There are two components in the analysis: whether the regulation makes
individualized assessments and whether a substantial burden exists. If the regulation does not
make individualized assessments, then even if the regulation substantially burdens free exercise,
RLUIPA does not apply. Additionally, if the regulation does make individualized assessments,
RLUIPA will not be relevant unless there is a substantial burden.

B. Individualized assessments and strict scrutiny
The “individualized assessments” language in RLUIPA purposefully mirrors and codifies
the “individualized exemption” language in Smith. The general consensus of courts is that
RLUIPA encompasses zoning and historic preservation laws that allow for individualized
exemptions. 118
For example, in Episcopal Student Foundation v. City of Ann Arbor, a federal district
court found that a denial of a demolition permit for a contributing building in a historic district
constituted an individualized assessment. 119 And in Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West
Linn, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that even though zoning or preservation ordinances
“are neutral laws of general applicability, their application to particular facts nevertheless can
constitute an individualized assessment—particularly where…the application does to involve a
mere numerical or mechanistic assessment, but on involving criteria that are at least partially
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subjective in nature.” 120
Even though the HPRB applies criteria in its decision of whether or not to deny a
demolition permit, the criteria are nevertheless subjective and require individualized
assessments. For example, § 6-1104 of the D.C. Code prohibits any demolition permit for a
landmark from being issued unless the Mayor finds the permit “is necessary in the public
interest” or that a failure to issue the permit “will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the
owner.” 121
The term “necessary in the special interest” is defined as being consistent with the
purposes of the act or necessary to create a project “of special merit.” 122 A project can be
considered of special merit if it contains “exemplary architecture,” “specific features of land
planning,” or “social or other benefits.” 123 Each of these determinations requires an individual,
fact specific assessment. In addition, while the Code standardizes the economic hardship review
by listing specific financial information an owner must submit, 124 the determination of whether
the hardship is unreasonable is nevertheless individualized.
Thus, even absent any evidence of discrimination, RLUIPA is triggered because the
denial of a demolition permit would require an individualized assessment.
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C. Historic preservation of a religious property does not create a substantial burden
unless religious exercise is effectively impracticable
It is important to note that strict scrutiny is not automatically invoked once an
individualized assessment is found. Every zoning and historic preservation system has
exemptions and requires individualized assessments, and to impose strict scrutiny without any
other showing would effectively create immunity from any individualized assessment, whether a
variance or permit. Such an interpretation of RLUIPA conflicts with the legislative intent of
Congress when passing the Act. In describing the effects of RLUIPA, the Senate sponsors of the
Act stated, “This Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use
regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from applying for variances, special permits
or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief provisions in land use regulations, where
available without discrimination or unfair delay.” 125
Therefore, the fact that Congress intended religious groups to apply for variances and
special permits shows that Congress intended many of these variances and permits to be upheld
under RLUIPA unless something else was shown: a substantial burden on religious exercise.
Once it is determined that RLUIPA applies because an individualized assessment is
made, the crucial question becomes whether a substantial burden exists. Once a substantial
burden is found, local preservation ordinances will rarely survive strict scrutiny review, in part
because historic preservation has never been held to constitute a compelling state interest.126
While RLUIPA does not define substantial burden, the legislative history states that courts
should “reference…Supreme Court jurisprudence” to establish what constitutes a substantial
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burden. 127 Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions show that the substantial burden test is a
difficult standard to meet 128 and is rarely satisfied without a showing of coercion, 129 animus
toward religion, 130 or the threat of criminal sanctions for religiously motivated activities. 131

Five circuits narrowly interpret “substantial burden”
The Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have narrowly interpreted the term
“substantial burden,” holding that inconveniences or financial difficulties do not rise to the level
of substantial burdens. The Second Circuit, suggesting in dicta that a town’s denial of a special
use permit for a religious day care center would not be a substantial burden, cautioned that if
RLUIPA is construed too broadly, “a serious question arises whether it goes beyond the proper
function of protecting the free exercise of religion into the constitutionally impermissible zone of
entwining government with religion in a manner that prefers religion over irreligion and confers
special benefits on it.” 132 In other words, courts should narrowly interpret what constitutes a
substantial burden on religion to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.
The Seventh Circuit, in one of the first cases addressing the question of what constituted
a substantial burden under RLUIPA, recognized that although RLUIPA expanded the definition
of religious exercise to include mere use of property for religious purposes, not every
127
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infringement on use would be substantial. In upholding Chicago’s requirement of a special use
permit for any church that sought to operate in a business or commercial zone, the court reasoned
that applying the substantial burden provision to any government action or regulation that
constrained the use of property for religious purposes “would render meaningless the word
‘substantial,’ because the slightest obstacle to religious exercise incidental to the regulation of
land use—however minor the burden it were to impose—could then constitute a burden
sufficient to trigger” RLUPIA’s strict scrutiny. 133 Thus, the Seventh Circuit defined a substantial
burden for RLUIPA purposes as a government action that “necessarily bears direct, primary, and
fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise--including the use of real property for
the purpose thereof within the regulated jurisdiction generally--effectively impracticable.” 134
The court justified its holding by claiming that a broader interpretation would impermissibly
create religious exemptions from land use and that “no such free pass for religious land uses
masquerades among the legitimate protections RLUIPA affords.” 135
Other circuits have followed this approach. For example, the Third Circuit held that a
city’s denial of a variance to build a church in a commercial district did not constitute a
substantial burden because the denial was not a “significantly great restriction” making religious
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exercise “effectively impracticable.” 136 The Fifth Circuit, in the context of an institutionalized
persons claim, held a “substantial burden” arises if government action “truly pressures the
adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious
beliefs.” 137 Echoing the element of coercion necessary for a substantial burden, the Ninth
Circuit held that a “substantial burden” must be “oppressive” and “render religious exercise
effectively impracticable.” 138 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, in holding that a city requirement
limiting churches and synagogues to the central business district did not impose a significant
burden to a synagogue who members did not live near by and had to walk farther to attend
services. 139 The court defined a “substantial burden” as one that “directly coerces the religious
adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.”

Historic preservation laws, unless they make the practice of religion effectively impracticable,
are not a substantial burden on religious exercise
Historic preservation laws, while they add financial expense and inconvenience, do not
necessarily rise to the level of a substantial burden. In Episcopal Student Foundation v. City of
Ann Arbor, the Eastern District of Michigan applied a narrow interpretation of substantial burden
in the context of historic preservation. The City of Ann Arbor denied a demolition permit to an
Episcopal organization near the University of Michigan that sought to demolish its two-story
building in a historic district. The group alleged its ministry had outgrown the historic structure
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and it wanted to erect a “large and multi-faceted church.” 140 The organization wanted to cater to
students, but alternative sites near the university campus were impossible to obtain.
Nevertheless, the court found no substantial burden because the preservation ordinance’s
financial burden and inconvenience did not “prevent the group from pursuing its religious
beliefs, coerce its members into abandoning or violating those beliefs, or dissuade members from
practicing their faith.” 141 It explicitly rejected the idea that the financial burdens on the religious
organization constituted a substantial burden. 142 The court recommended a variety of
alternatives, which included renting worship space in another facility or constructing an addition
on the site. 143
Thus, the holding of Episcopal Student strongly supports the constitutionality of not
exempting religious groups from historic preservation regulations. In fact, the holding of
Episcopal Student is in some regard even more compelling than St. Bartholomew’s because the
building at issue in Episcopal Student—like Third Church—is used for worship, not merely
social services or offices, as was the case in St. Bartholomew’s. Thus, even though the building
was more closely tied to a central religious exercise, the burden in not being able to demolish the
structure was insufficient to violate the free exercise clause.

Circuits retreat from narrow interpretation of substantial burden upon a colorable showing of
religious discrimination
However, several recent decisions have retreated from the narrow interpretation of

140

Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
Id. at 704.
142
Id. at 706 (“Finally, although Canterbury House may incur additional financial burdens, such as rental
expenses to accommodate its entire congregation on occasion, or if it seek additional growth, such
financial burdens are not ‘substantial’ under RLUIPA.”).
143
Id.
141

34

substantial burden. The Seventh Circuit, in the year after its decision in Civil Liberties,
significantly broadened the scope of a substantial burden. Distinguishing and not overruling
Civil Liberties, the Seventh Circuit in Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v.
City of New Berlin held that “delay, uncertainty, and expense” resulting from the denial of a
request to rezone for religious use constituted an impermissible substantial burden.144 The
burden need “not be insuperable” to be substantial. 145 However, in addition to the denial, the
city had committed a series of legal errors, and the court found the mayor was “playing a
delaying game,” and all this created the inference of less than good faith on the part of the
city. 146
Similarly, in Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, the Ninth Circuit,
applying the reasoning of San Jose Christian, held that Sutter County’s repeated denials of a
conditional use permit to build a Sikh temple constituted a substantial burden. 147 The court
implied the possibility of subtle discrimination in the county’s denial, based upon the county’s
inconsistent application of zoning law, its law of explanation for denial despite the group’s good
faith efforts to satisfy every mitigation condition. 148

A broad interpretation of substantial burden is not applicable to Third Church because no
evidence of religious discrimination exists
New Berlin and Garu Nanak are distinguishable from Episcopal Student and the issue in
Third Church because they raise issues of administrative incompetence or, at worst, discrete
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discrimination. In contrast, the HPRB has signaled its willingness to work with Third Church in
reaching a compromise. 149 Moreover, the administrative record shows that the church was
landmarked because it was an example of Brutalist architecture, not because the HPRB wanted
to restrict the religious practice of the Christian Scientists. New Berlin and Garu Nanak are also
distinguishable in that they deal with the siting and creation of new houses of worship. By
repeatedly denying the conditional use permit to the Sikhs, the County of Sutter was severely
restricting their ability to locate. But the burden involved in not being able to establish a house
of worship is far greater than the burden in not being able to alter an established church building.
While the denials of siting approval do not directly coerce a religious adherent to alter his
beliefs, it does make religious exercise, to adopt the term from the Seventh Circuit in Civil
Liberties, “effectively impracticable.”

While preservation regulations impose financial costs on Third Church, they do not necessarily
rise to the level of a substantial burden on free exercise
In contrast, preventing the demolition of Third Church of Christ, Scientist, would not
necessarily make religious exercise “effectively impracticable” because religious exercise would
continue as it had since the building was completed in 1971. This makes Third Church different
from other cases where courts have been willing to find a substantial burden when a church is
denied a permit to construct a building for religious worship. 150 While congregants claim that
the church is unwelcoming and that it costs $8,000 to erect scaffolding to change the
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lightbulbs, 151 government actions that make the practice of religion more inconvenient or
expensive—without making religious use impractical—have not been found to constitute a
substantial burden upon religion. 152
Of course, this is not to say that a financial burden on religious exercise could never rise
to the level of a significant burden. Applying the test adopted by the Seventh Circuit and others,
Third Church would have to show that its finances are in such poor shape that the maintenance
costs made religious exercise “effectively impractical.” 153 Considering that the congregation has
declined from several hundred to approximately fifty or sixty weekly worshippers, 154 this is not
unrealistic.
No court has decided what level of financial burden would amount to a substantial burden
for either RLUIPA or First Amendment purposes, 155 but based upon St. Bartholomew’s and
Episcopal Student, the court’s inquiry would be detailed and searching. To remain consistent
with St. Bartholomew’s, Third Church would have to provide “financial projections or cash flow
analyses” to prove financing of repairs and maintenance were infeasible and would “prohibit”
religious exercise, not merely make it more difficult. 156 In addition, the Second Circuit’s opinion
implies that a court would not run afoul of the constitution by requiring Third Church to mount a
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good faith fundraising drive. 157 While St. Bartholomew’s is a pre-RLUIPA case, using the St.
Bartholomew’s analysis as a guide is appropriate because the legislative history of RLUIPA
suggests that substantial burden should be interpreted in line with precedent. 158
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 900 G Street Associates v. Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs held that an owner had to undertake good faith efforts to rent
or sell the building before the court would make a finding of economic hardship. 159 While 900
G Street involved a takings claim of a commercial building and not free exercise claim, it
nevertheless reinforces the fact that a plaintiff carries a significant burden in alleging economic
hardship. The opinion in 900 G Street thus implies that Third Church may have to undertake
good faith efforts to rent out parts of the building (perhaps for conferences) before the court
would be willing to find the financial burdens substantial.

Substantial burden determination resembles Fifth Amendment takings analysis
Third Church’s showing that religious exercise was “effectively impractical” therefore
would be similar to the analysis of a Fifth Amendment takings claim. This is not to say that
Third Church must bring a successful takings claim first, but merely that the level of the burden
is very similar. 160
In Society for Ethical Culture v. Spratt, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected the
claim that the landmark designation of a historic mansion used by a charitable organization
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constituted an unconstitutional taking. 161 The court stated that the landmark designation of a
non-profit organization would be constitutionally permissible so long as “it does not physically
or financially prevent, or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose.” 162
The Society for Ethical Culture had claimed its historic building was ill-suited for its needs.
However, the court said the society had not proved its activities within the building were
“wrongfully disrupted” by the landmark designation and that the society was not entitled to put
the property to its most beneficial use. 163 The court in Ethical Culture distinguished an older
case, Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, which had found that landmark
designation to a church-owned property constituted a “naked taking.” 164
In Lutheran Church, the landmark structure had become so “hopelessly inadequate to the
church needs” that had the regulations been applied, the charitable activity would have had no
alternative but to cease. 165 However, the Society for Ethical Culture—like Third Church—had
not shown that the building was so “hopelessly inadequate” that the regulations would have had
“no alternative” but to cause the charitable activity to cease.166 While Third Church could argue
that the historic preservation regulations “seriously interfere” with their religious activity, Ethical
Culture says that only when charitable activity would cease does the regulation work a taking. 167
Similarly, the Second Circuit stated in St. Bartholomew’s that a preservation law does not
cause a taking—even though the regulation interfered with the church’s mission—because the

161

Society for Ethical Culture v. Spratt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 926 (N.Y. 1980).
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See also Sailors’ Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (upholding landmark
designation of historic building owned by charitable organization because the designation neither
“physically or financially prevents” or “seriously interferes” with the organization’s charitable purpose.).
162

39

religious entity could continue its existing activities in its current facilities. 168 In adapting the
Supreme Court’s Penn Central test to property used for religious or charitable purposes, the
court stated that “so long as the Church can continue to use its property in the way that it has
been using it, there is no unconstitutional taking.” 169 In essence, then, the trigger for a takings
claim in both Ethical Culture and St. Bartholomew’s—the inability to continue use—is the same
as for a free exercise claim: that religious exercise is “effectively impracticable.”

D. Role for accommodation
Considering that the law in this area is uncertain, the District would be well-served by
offering to accommodate Third Church. Accommodation does create a real problem in that a
landmark is a landmark and each property is supposed to protected to the same extent as any
other. However, the political realities involved here as well as the burden shifting that RLUIPA
imposes encourage accommodation.
The statutory language of RLUIPA provides that the government can alleviate substantial
burdens by proposing accommodations to religious entities. 170 The legislative history of
RLUIPA states that a claimant has the burden of showing that any proposed accommodation by
the government to relieve the burden on religion is either “unreasonable or ineffective” before
the claimant can prevail under the statute.171 As a consequence, assuming a substantial burden
exists, the HPRB can propose a compromise—perhaps an alteration to the entrance to make it
more welcoming—that addresses its preservation concerns as well as Third Church’s concerns,
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and Third Church would have to show the accommodation is “unreasonable or ineffective.”
Accommodation is preferable because it reduces litigation costs and removes the controversy
from the uncertainty of the courts.
Accommodation is preferable for political reasons as well. Even if a potential Third
Church challenge to the Mayor’s Agent’s denial of a demolition permit were rejected in the
courts, the controversy could jeopardize the District’s overall ability to protect churches. The
initial landmarking decision has caused vocal outrage from some segments in the community,
and District of Columbia Councilmember Jack Evans introduced a bill (which he withdrew a few
days later) that would exempt houses of worship from historic preservation laws upon a
statement of opposition from the religious entity. 172 While Evans’ proposal presents its own
constitutional challenges—it might present an unconstitutional establishment of religion to allow
religious entities to opt-out of historic preservation laws 173 —a similar law was enacted and
upheld as constitutional in California. 174
The controversy from the case could jeopardize public support of including religious
buildings within the overall historic preservation regime. 175 Preservationists should want to
prevent a law like California’s from being adopted in the District. Therefore, while the
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preservation laws stand a good chance of surviving a free exercise and RLUIPA challenge by
Third Church, the realities of preserving the integrity of preservation laws as applied to religious
structures urge efforts to accommodate.

CONCLUSION
Historic preservation of religious properties poses numerous constitutional and policy
questions. The legality of historic preservation in the context of religious properties is more
uncertain because the religious entities have a constitutional protection to free exercise that
ordinary landowners do not enjoy. The discrepancy in case law reflects the difficulty courts
having in applying free exercise jurisprudence to this area. Despite the uncertainty and
sometimes conflicting opinions, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in St. Bartholomew’s
and its vacation of First Covenant during the same term strongly suggest that the Court would
not consider the preservation of a religious property to be a violation of the free exercise clause.
Similarly, the decision in Episcopal Student, which is factually similar to the situation
involving Third Church, suggests that the denial of a demolition permit would not be a
substantial burden on religious exercise under RLUIPA. These two decisions, particularly in
light of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ preservation-friendly opinions in
Metropolitan Baptist and Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. District of Columbia, 176 greatly
reduces the probability of a successful lawsuit by Third Church. In order to prevail, Third
Church would have to show that the preservation regulations made its religious exercise
“effectively impracticable.”
But the tension between preservation of churches and religious exercise will only become

176

Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. District of Columbia, No. 06-AA-1083 (D.C. Mar. 20, 2008).

42

more pronounced as congregations with historic churches suffer from shrinking
congregations. 177 Faced with increased maintenance costs and decreased attendance and tithing,
this may be the first of many such challenges.
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APPENDIX A
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc (2000)
Protection of land use as religious exercise
(a) Substantial burdens
(1) General rule
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(2) Scope of application
This subsection applies in any case in which-(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation
or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place
formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make,
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.
(b) Discrimination and exclusion
(1) Equal terms
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
institution.
(2) Nondiscrimination
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates
against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.
(3) Exclusions and limits
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that-(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a
jurisdiction.
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APPENDIX B
D.C. Code § 6-1104(e) (2000)
(1) In any instance where there is a claim of unreasonable economic hardship, the owner shall
submit, by affidavit, to the Mayor at least 20 days prior to the public hearing, at least the
following information:
(A) For all property:
(i) The amount paid for the property, the date of purchase and the party from whom
purchased, including a description of the relationship, if any, between the owner and the
person from whom the property was purchased;
(ii) The assessed value of the land and improvements thereon according to the two most
recent assessments;
(iii) Real estate taxes for the previous two years;
(iv) Annual debt service, if any, for the previous two years;
(v) All appraisals obtained within the previous two years by the owner or applicant in
connection with his purchase, financing or ownership of the property;
(vi) Any listing of the property for sale or rent, price asked, and offers received, if any;
and
(vii)
Any consideration by the owner as to profitable adaptive uses for the property;
and
(B) For income-producing property:
(i) Annual gross income from the property for the previous two years;
(ii) Itemized operating and maintenance expenses for the previous two years;
(iii) Annual cash flow, if any, for the previous two years.
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